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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in health care now give doctors the ability to extend our
lives long after our powers to appreciate it are dead and gone.' Through life
support systems, including artificial nutrition and hydration, individuals can be
kept alive indefinitely in hospital beds despite the fact they are unconscious and
totally unaware of their surroundings. Such individuals would die naturally
except for the machines that sustain them, but they are mechanically kept alive,
suspended between life and death as many of us would normally define those
terms.2
Although some think that the sanctity of life requires us to prolong it as
long as we are technically able, others feel that this technology merely extends
the pain of the victim's loved ones, preventing the patient from moving on into
the next world and slowing the healing process of those left behind. 3 Thus, an
inherent conflict is born when an individual is placed on life support systems
between those who wish the systems removed and those who desire the patient
to be artificially sustained.
These conflicts gave rise to a variety of case law and statutory law as the
individual states began to wrestle with the problems of defining life and death.
In order to handle these problems, many states passed statutes allowing
individuals to make these decisions for themselves through advance directives,
in case they become incapacitated in the future. 4 This, however, did not solve
the problems in cases in which individuals became permanently unconscious
without advance directives. Complicated issues arose as to what extent the state
could prevent loved ones from terminating the life support systems, despite the
fact that family members thought it was either in the patient's best interests or
1 Patients in a permanently vegetative state, or a PVS, which will be defined below,
can survive five, ten, and even twenty years through life support systems. Ronald E.
Cranford, M.D., The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts
Straight), in HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, February/March 1988, at 27, 31.
2 The plight of individuals in a PVS is discussed in detail in Part 11 of this Note, as is
the issue of why PVS patients are not, at least by medical standards, "dead."
3 See, e.g., Matter of Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
4 When Ohio enacted the laws recognizing living wills, it joined forty-one other states
that had previously done so. M. Rose Gasner, The Unconstitutional Treatment of Nancy
Cruzan, 7 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 1, 14-15 (1990).
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would have been the individual's desires. This problem came to the forefront
when the Supreme Court heard its first right to die case, Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health.5
Since that decision, the State of Ohio has enacted its own legislation
concerning life support systems and the right of individuals to refrain from
such treatment. This Note will analyze the Ohio statute in light of the Cruzan
decision, and also question the wisdom of the statute given the medical and
practical realities of individuals who are permanently unconscious. Part II of
this Note will briefly examine the medical status of PVS patients. 6 Part III will
look into the history behind the Ohio statute and summarize its most
controversial provisions, the sections dealing with nondeclarants. Part IV will
consider the Cruzan holding in some detail and decide what constitutional
protections, if any, the Court established for an individual's right to die. Part V
will then determine if the Ohio statute is constitutionally sound given the
Supreme Court's holding in Cruzan. Finally, Part VI will then scrutinize the
practical implications of Ohio's living will statute in light of modem popular
and medical opinions.
It. THE MEDICAL STATUS OF THE PERMANENTLY UNCONSCIOUS
Before plunging into any legal inquiries on what the law is or should be
concerning the permanently unconscious, it should be obvious that one needs to
understand exactly what "permanently unconscious" means from a medical
perspective. To do this, it is helpful to distinguish between those that have
suffered clinical "brain death," those in irreversible comas, and individuals in
persistent vegetative states ("PVS"), or in other words, those who are
permanently unconscious. 7
The brain stem, located in the lower center of the brain, controls what may
be considered our "lower" functions, such as respiration, reflexes, and
pupillary response to light.8 The cerebral hemispheres, or more specifically,
the cerebral cortex located in the outer layers of the cerebral hemispheres,
control what may be considered our higher functions, including consciousness,
awareness, and other voluntary and involuntary actions. 9 When a person
5 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
6 PVS, or "persistent vegetative state," will be used interchangeably throughout the
text with the term "permanently unconscious."
7 Cranford, supra note 1, at 27-28.
8 Id. at 27.
9 Id.
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suffers brain death, not only do the higher functions of the cerebral cortex
cease, but all of the "lower" brain stem functions are lost as well, including the
most primitive cough and gag reflexes and spontaneous respiration. 10 Some
semi-autonomous functions not totally dependent on the brain stem, such as
one's heartbeat, may continue despite the fact that the person is clinically brain
dead. 1
Patients in a PVS, on the other hand, generally have not suffered
neurological damage to either the brain stem or the ascending reticular
activating system, which is located in the brain stem and is responsible for
arousing the entire brain.' 2 This phenomenon occurs because the cerebral
cortex suffers severe damage from lack of blood (ischemia) or lack of oxygen
(hypoxia) much more quickly than the lower brain stem.' 3 Thus, for example,
a person who experiences either loss of blood or loss of oxygen to the brain for
four to six minutes will likely suffer a complete loss of the cerebral cortex but
not the brain stem.14 The patient will then enter into a temporary coma, and
then "awaken" into a PVS, from which there is no recovery.' 5
Patients in a PVS manifest a variety of deceiving symptoms that make them
appear to be awake. For example, their eyes remain open, and they go through
periods of being asleep or awake.16 They also retain the protective gag and
cough reflexes.17 Further, they may make unintelligible sounds, smile, dart
their eyes toward moving objects or sudden noises, and reflexively withdraw
from noxious or painful stimuli.' 8
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 27-28.
14 1 d. at 28.
15 Id. The difference between a coma and a persistent vegetative state is discussed infra
note 17.
16 Id.
17 These are the main differences between comatose patients and PVS patients.
Patients in comas are in more of a "sleeplike" state, with eyes closed, as a result of damage
to the reticular activating system in the brain stem. Further, patients in comas do not have
the cough and gag reflexes that exist in PVS patients. The cough, gag, and swallowing
reflexes are actually of critical importance, as they clear the passages of the throat and
lungs, thus preventing often fatal respiratory infections. Indeed, the retention of these
reflexes is one of the main reasons PVS patients may survive for such long periods of time.
Id.
18 Council Report, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or
Withhold Life Support, JAMA, January 19, 1990, at 426, 427.
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It must be emphasized that, despite the appearance of being awake, PVS
patients do not experience pain nor pleasure. Although these symptoms may
deceive those outside the medical profession, it is well established in the
medical community that such reactions from painful stimuli are peripheral only,
and that PVS patients do not have the requisite consciousness to feel pain
because of the loss of the cerebral cortex. 19 In fact, the defining factor for PVS
patients is that they are totally unaware of themselves and their surroundings,
and thus cannot experience any emotion or feeling whatsoever. 20
Thus, PVS patients present those in the medical and legal profession with
some interesting dilemmas. They are not "dead" according to society's
traditional definition, because they have not experienced the requisite loss of
the brain stem to qualify as "brain dead." Yet they are permanently
unconscious, lack any awareness of themselves or their environment, and have
no hope of recovery. It is with these medical realities that courts and
legislatures have confronted the "right to die" issue.
II. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE OHIO STATUTE
The right to die issue first presented itself in Ohio in a case concerning one
Edna Marie Leach. 21 Leach, a seventy year old woman, suffered from
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a disease that caused progressive deterioration of
the nervous system which would eventually result in her death within three to
five years. 22 She was admitted to Akron General Hospital on July 27, 1980, as
her condition had severely worsened and she was having difficulty breathing.23
19 Cranford, supra note 1, at 31. Council Report, supra note 18, at 428. Indeed, it
might very well be the deceiving characteristics of a PVS patient that have prompted many
state legislatures to pass such restrictive laws concerning the termination of life support
systems from PVS patients.
20 Cranford, supra note 1, at 28; Council Report, supra note 18, at 427. In other
words, "pain and suffering are absent, as are joy, satisfaction, and pleasure. Disability is
total and no return to an even minimal level of social functioning is possible." Jay Gold,
The Status of the Permanently Unconscious: "You Call that Livng?", 42 MERCER L. REv.
1087, 1090 (1991) (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGo
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 181-82 (1983)).
21 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
2 2 Id. at 810.
23 Id.
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On July 29, while in the hospital, Leach suffered a coronary attack.24 Her
heartbeat was quickly restored, but she had to be placed on life support systems
that included a respirator to enable her to breathe and a nasogastric tube for
feeding. Thus, Leach not only suffered from a debilitating terminal illness, but
was in a chronic vegetative state as a result of the cardiac arrest.25
Mr. Leach, after carefully considering his wife's predicament, requested
that the life support systems be terminated. The attending physician, however,
while acknowledging the hopelessness of her condition, stated that the life
support systems could not be discontinued without a court order. 26 Mr. Leach
thus petitioned the court to have the systems shut down. 27 At the trial, several
witnesses close to Leach testified to numerous conversations with her in which
she expressly stated she would not wish to be placed on life support systems.28
The court was then forced to decide what right, if any, existed to allow Leach
to be taken off life support systems.29
As this was a case of first impression in the State of Ohio, the court looked
at case law in other jurisdictions for guidance: specifically, In re Quinlan, 30
and a New York case, In re Eichner.31 Based on these two precedents the court
held that an individual has a right to privacy that enables a person who is
permanently unconscious and terminally ill to refuse life sustaining treatment,
24 Id.
5 Id.
26 Id. at 811.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 812.
30 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The case of
Karen Quinlan is generally regarded as the grandfather of life support removal decisions.
Karen Quinlan's life support systems included artificial nutrition and hydration as well as a
respirator. Karen's father sought removal of the life support systems based on three
grounds: 1) the constitutional right of freedom of religion; 2) the constitutional freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment; and 3) the constitutional right to privacy. After
rejecting the first two grounds, the Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed Karen's father to
terminate the life support systems based on the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 664.
31 In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431 (N.Y. 1980). In this case an eighty-three year old
man was placed on life support systems after a cardiac arrest. After finding that he would
not have wanted to be on life support systems had he been able to decide, the court allowed
the life support systems to be terminated based on a constitutional right to privacy. Id. at
461. Although Quinlan, Eichner, and Leach all based their holdings on a constitutional right
to privacy, the Supreme Court has stated that such interests must now be analyzed as a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest instead. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying
text.
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as long as it is established by clear and convincing evidence that this would
have been the patient's desire.32 This fundamental right to privacy could only
be violated with a compelling state interest. 33
The court then found that there was no sufficient state interest that could
outweigh the individual's constitutional right to privacy.34 Further, the court
held that the burden of proof was satisfied by the testimony of Ms. Leach's
friends and family.35 As a result, the court ordered that the life support systems
be terminated. 36 Thus, the Leach case seemed to establish a right to privacy in
Ohio that would allow certain individuals to be taken off life support systems.
However, in 1989, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Ohio Revised
Code sections 1337.11 through 1337.17. 37 The statute provides regulations
allowing an individual to delegate to attorneys-in-fact the power to make health
care decisions for the individual in case that person should become
incapacitated and thus unable to make informed health care choices. The law,
though, prevents an attorney-in-fact from withdrawing artificial nutrition or
hydration from a principal unless the death of the principal was "imminent." 38
In other words, the statute forbids the removal of artificial nutrition and
hydration when the principal would subsequently die as a result of malnutrition
or dehydration.
32 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.W.2d 809, 816 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
33 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
34 Leach, 526 N.E.2d at 816.
35 Id.
3 6 Id.
37 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-.17 (Baldwin 1991).
38 Section 1337.13 of the 1989 statute reads:
(E) An attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for health care does not
have authority to refuse or withdraw informed consent to the provision of nutrition and
hydration to the principal, unless...
(2) In the opinion of the principal's attending physician and at least one other
physician, either of the following situations exist:
(a) The death of the principal is imminent whether or not nutrition or hydration is
provided to the principal, and the nonprovision of nutrition or hydration to the principal
is not likely to result in the death of the principal by malnutrition or dehydration;
(b) If nutrition or hydration were provided to the principal, the nutrition or
hydration either could not be assimilated or would shorten the life of the principal.
Id. § 1337.13.
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The impact of the statute can be seen in Couture v. Couture.39 In Couture,
twenty-nine year old Daniel Couture went into a coma, allegedly after taking
certain medication. 40 Daniel was placed on life support systems that included a
respirator and nutrition and hydration feeding tubes, but was eventually taken
off the respirator and began breathing on his own. 41 However, Daniel still
remained in a persistent vegetative state with no realistic hope for recovery.42
Further, even with the continued administration of nutrition and hydration,
Daniel would live only one to two months longer because of a continual
buildup of fluid in his brain that would eventually cause the failure of his major
bodily systems. 43
Daniel's guardians and the Miami Valley Hospital contended that because
Daniel was in a persistent vegetative state with little hope for recovery, and
because sufficient evidence had been presented showing Daniel would have
objected to the life support systems, the guardians and the hospital had the legal
right to discontinue life support treatment. 44 The court disagreed. 45 Citing the
Ohio Revised Code, section 1337.13, the court found that because
attorneys-in-fact are not permitted to withdraw nutrition and hydration unless
the death of the principal is imminent, then a guardian's power must also be
limited by the statute.46 Indeed, the court logically concluded that because a
guardian's decision to discontinue life support relies on casual oral remarks, as
opposed to an attorney-in-fact whose power comes from an express writing,
then a guardian's right to discontinue nutrition and hydration is even less
compelling than an attorney-in-fact.47 Thus, because the court concluded that
Daniel's guardian had no more power than an attorney-in-fact under the statute,
and because Daniel's death could not be considered imminent, Daniel's
nutrition and hydration could not be removed.48 The Couture decision thus
severely limited the ability to remove individuals from artificial nutrition and
hydration.
However, on October 10, 1991, just slightly two years after the Couture
decision, Senate Bill One went into effect, again changing the state of the law
39 Couture v. Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
40 Id. at 572.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 573.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id. at 577.
46 Id. at 574-76.
47 Id. at 576.
48 Id. at 577.
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in Ohio concerning the removal of life support systems from incapacitated
patients.49 Ohio's new living will statute provides individuals with two ways of
determining how decisions concerning life support systems will be made if they
should be unable to make those decisions for themselves. 50
The first possibility is that an individual may establish a durable power of
attorney for health care, or a DPAHC. 51 That is, an individual may execute a
document that gives another person the power to make medical decisions for
that individual if the individual becomes unable to make such decisions. 52
The second way the Ohio statute allows an individual to indicate his or her
desires concerning life-sustaining treatment is through a living will. 53 A living
will is a legal document in which a person indicates his or her desires regarding
the administration of life-sustaining treatment should they become either
terminally ill, permanently unconscious, or both.54 Prior to the enactment of
the new statute, living wills were not recognized in the State of Ohio. 55
The regulations governing living wills and DPAHC are lengthy and
detailed, but in most respects, the Ohio statute is similar to other state statutes
authorizing advance directives. 56 The most controversial part of Ohio's living
will statute, however, is the provision governing incapacitated patients that
49 1991 Ohio Laws File 36 (S.B. 1).
50 OHIoREv. CODEANN. §§ 1337.11-.17, 2133.01-.15 (Baldwin 1991).
51 Id. § 1337.12.
52 Id.
53 Id. § 2133.02(A)(1), (2).
54 Id. The Ohio statute defines a permanently unconscious state as "a state of
permanent unconsciousness in a principal that... is characterized by both of the following:
(1) The principal is irreversibly unaware of himself and his environment. (2) There is a total
loss of cerebral cortical functioning, resulting in the principal having no capacity to
experience pain or suffering." Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.110() (Baldwin 1991).
Terminal condition is defined as "an irreversible, incurable, and untreatable condition
caused by disease, illness, or injury from which, to a reasonable degree of medical
standards... both of the following apply: (1) There can be no recovery. (2) Death is likely
to occur within a relatively short period of time if life-sustaining treatment is not
administered." OIoREv. CODE ANN. § 1337.11(Y) (Baldwin 1991).
55 The 1989 laws did not recognize living wills, thus their validity could have been
used only to express the individual's desire concerning life support. However, knowledge of
the individual's desire was irrelevant under the 1989 statute. See supra notes 44-48 and
accompanying text.
56 For a detailed analysis of the mechanics surrounding the implementation and results
of making an advance directive under the Ohio statute, see William M. Todd, Directing
Health-Care Choices, OHio LAWYER, September/October 1991, at 10.
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have not left an advance directive.57 In the case of terminally ill patients, the
Ohio statute allows the next of kin to terminate the life support systems as long
as the decision is made in good faith and is consistent with what the terminally
ill patient would have desired. 58
However, the Ohio statute treats permanently unconscious patients who are
also terminally ill differently than those who are not. The statute mandates that
permanently unconscious but not terminally ill patients who do not have an
advance directive cannot have life support systems removed by the next of kin
for twelve months.59 Further, the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration,
as opposed to the removal of other forms of life support such as respirators,
may only be removed with approval from the probate court, which takes an
additional one to two months. 60
The probate court can approve the removal of artificial nutrition and
hydration from a permanently unconscious patient who has not left an advance
directive only if the following conditions are established by clear and
convincing evidence: 1) The patient is no longer able to make such decisions
and is not likely to regain such capacity; 2) the consent process complied with
the requirements of the law; 3) the withdrawal of artificial nutrients is within
the patient's previously expressed wishes; 4) the patient is in a permanently
unconscious state and has been in such state for at least the preceding twelve
months.61 These provisions, in effect, prevent a permanently unconscious
patient without an advance directive from having life support systems removed
for twelve to fourteen months.
The Ohio statute attempts to solve the problems surrounding the difficult
decisions of removing life support systems by providing an individual with the
opportunity to implement an advance directive. The fact of the matter is,
however, that most people will never put an advance directive into effect.62 As
a result, most permanently unconscious patients in Ohio will remain on life
57 Id. at 10-13.
58 O-noREv. CODE ANN. § 2133.08 (Baldwin 1991).
59 Id. § 2133.09.
60 Id. § 2133.09(A)(6).
61 Id. § 2133.09(C)(2).
62 Studies seem to vary, but at least one shows that only 9% of the population has
executed advance directives. Gasner, supra note 4, at 8 (citing Emmanuel, The Medical
Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288 (1989)); see
also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 n.1 (1990) (citing
American Medical Association Surveys of P~ysician and Public Opinion on Health Care
Issues 29-30 (1988) (stating 15% of those'surveyed had executed a living will)).
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support systems for at least one year, even if it is contrary to their wishes as
expressed at other times and in other ways.
Whether or not the Ohio statute infringes on an individual's constitutional
rights is unclear. The Supreme Court has dealt with the right to die issue only
once, in the landmark case Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health.63 The
Court's holding, however, was extremely narrow and provided little guidance
to the states for defining acceptable boundaries in limiting the removal of
life-sustaining treatment.64 Regardless, to determine the constitutional validity
of the Ohio provision, the statute must be analyzed in light of Cruzan, as it is
the only case in which the Court has spoken on this issue.
IV. THE CRUZANDECISION
On January 11, 1983, twenty-five year old Nancy Cruzan lost control of
her car while driving late one evening in Jasper County, Missouri. 65 The car
overturned, and when paramedics arrived, they discovered Cruzan lying face
down in a ditch without respiratory and cardiac functions. 66 Although the
paramedics restored her heartbeat and breathing, Nancy Cruzan remained in a
permanent vegetative state, without the cognitive or reflexive ability to swallow
food. 67 Further, the paramedics estimated that her brain was deprived of
oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes, resulting in irreversible brain damage,
and rendering her a spastic quadriplegic. 68
When it became evident that Nancy Cruzan would never regain
consciousness, her parents requested that the life support systems be
terminated. 69 The hospital, however, refused to terminate the systems without a
court order. 70 The parents sought a court order but were denied because the
63 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
64 The Court stated that when "deciding 'a question of such magnitude and
importance... it is the [better] part of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to
cover every possible phase of the subject.'" Id. at 277 (quoting Twin City Bank v. Nebeker,
167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897)).
65 Id. at 266.
66 Id. Footnote one of the opinion contains a complete description of the state supreme
court's findings concerning Nancy Cruzan's condition, including the fact that she was
"oblivious to her environment except for reflexive responses to sound and perhaps painful
stimuli."
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 267.
7 0 Id. at 268.
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State of Missouri would not allow the termination of artificial nutrition and
hydration unless it could be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
incapacitated patient would have wished to be taken off life support systems.
The Missouri Supreme Court then found that the parents had not sustained their
burden of proof and denied the parents' request. 71
The parents of Nancy Cruzan appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States claiming that the "clear and convincing" evidence standard was too high
a burden of proof and was thus unconstitutional based on the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.72 The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote,
rejected the parents' claim and upheld Missouri's clear and convincing evidence
standard. 73
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, however, does seem to indicate
that there are limits on a state's power to force artificial nutrition and hydration
on a permanently unconscious patient. The Court noted at the outset that it is
generally accepted that a competent individual has the right to refuse medical
treatment.74 The Court then had to decide, however, whether the right of a
competent person to refuse medical treatment included the right to refuse
lifesaving nutrition and hydration, in light of the "dramatic consequences
involved in the refusal of such treatment. " 75
Whether or not the Court actually recognized such a right is still a matter
of some debate.76 The Court stated that for the purposes of the present case,
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 269. Although the decision was five to four, the makeup of the Supreme
Court has changed since the decision. Two of the dissenting justices, Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall, have been replaced by Justices Souter and Thomas, respectively. It is very
possible that the two new justices will be more protective of the state legislatures' power to
regulate in this area as well as others.
74 Id. The Court noted that the doctrine of informed consent is well established in
American tort law. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS §
9, at 189-92 (5th ed. 1984). The Court, citing previous cases, then noted that the right to
refuse medical treatment also has constitutional dimensions. See Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990) (finding that liberty interests were implicated through forced injections into
nonconsenting individuals); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (mandatory behavior
modification treatment implicated liberty interests).
75 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,279 (1990).
76 See, e.g., John Nicholas Suhr, Jr., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health: A Clear and Convincing Call for Comprehensive Legislation to Protect Incompetent
Patients' Rights, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1477, 1540 (1991) ("The majority found that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining
nutrition and hydration."). But cf William Leschensky, Constitutional Protection of the
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they would "assume that the United States Constitution would grant a
competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition," thus causing some disagreement as to whether the
Court has actually established such a right.77 The opinion, however, should
probably be read as recognizing the right to refuse such treatment because the
Court later reiterated the existence of this right when it stated that "the due
process clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing
life-sustaining medical treatment." 78 Justice O'Connor's concurrence stated that
she agreed with the majority opinion that a liberty interest exists that allows an
individual to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration. 79 Thus, the Cruzan case
seems to establish that a competent person has the right to refuse artificially
delivered nutrition and hydration.
Assuming that such a right exists, it should be noted that the right stems
not from a general constitutional right to privacy, however, but from a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.80 This distinction is crucial because
had the right been established as a fundamental right to privacy, only a
compelling state interest would have allowed the states to infringe on this
right.81 Because the Court considered the right as a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest instead, the individual has somewhat less protection.82 Under a
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, the Court must balance the individual's
liberty interest against the relevant state interests to determine whether there
has been a constitutional infringement.8 3 Only if the individual interests
outweigh the state interests will a constitutional violation exist. 84
Further, it is extremely important that although the Court recognized that a
competent individual has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the Court
made explicit that an incompetent person's right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment is different because the right must be exercised through a surrogate.85
Refusal-of-Treatment: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 14 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. PoL'Y 248, 249 (1991) ("The Cruzan majority did not decide, however, whether
this liberty interest extends to the refusal of lifesaving hydration and nutrition.").
77 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
7 8 Id. at 281.
79 Id. at 287.
80 Id. at 279 n.7.
81 See Jennifer E. Bennett Overton, Unanswered Implications--he Couded Rights of
the Incompetent Patient Under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 69
N.C. L. REv. 1293, 1307 (1991).
82 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990).
83 Id. at 278.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 280.
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It could have been argued that the Equal Protection Clause mandated that an
incompetent person's right to refuse treatment must be honored by the state in
the same manner as a competent person's because the state must treat them
equally. The Court's recognition of the differences between competent and
incompetent patients, however, now apparently precludes the families of the
patient from making an Equal Protection Clause argument.86
Also, the difference between a competent and incompetent person's ability
to exercise their liberty interest proved crucial to the Court's decision.87 When
balancing the rights of the individual and the interests of the state, the Court
recognized that the state has an interest in "the protection and preservation of
human life."88 However, this general state interest in human life was not the
basis on which the Court upheld Missouri's clear and convincing evidence
standard.89 Instead, the Court found that, in the present case, the state "has
more particular interests at stake." 90 For example, the states may guard against
potential abuses of surrogates who would terminate life support systems in their
own self interest, regardless of the wishes of the patient.91 Further, the states
may also impose a heightened evidentiary standard to ensure that the
factfinding process remains accurate, as it is likely that the adversarial process,
and thus the accuracy of the determinations, will be diminished. 92 It was these
more particular state interests that made the Court's decision relatively easy in
upholding Missouri's clear and convincing evidence standard.
The Cruzan decision thus answered several important questions
surrounding the right to die issue. The case apparently established a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest in refusing artificial nutrition and hydration.
However, an incompetent person's right to refuse such treatment is not
necessarily equal to that of a competent person's because the wishes of an
incompetent patient who has not left an advance directive are not easily known.
The patient's interest must then be balanced against the state interests. Included
86 The state trial court partially relied on the Equal Protection Clause in deciding that
Nancy Cruzan had a right to have the nutrition and hydration terminated. Cruzan v.
Harman, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). This argument, though, would now seem to be moot. See
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 n.12 (rejecting petitioners' Equal Protection Clause claim on
grounds that competent and incompetent persons are not similarly situated).
8 7 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1990).
8 8 Id. at 280.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 281.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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among state interests are the protection and preservation of human life, and
most importantly to the Cruzan holding, an interest in accurately determining
the incompetent person's wishes. It is against these findings that the Ohio
statute must now be compared.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE OHIO STATUTE IN LIGHT OF CRUZAN
The Ohio statute presents a more difficult constitutional issue than the
Cruzan case. The Ohio living will statute mandates that a person without an
advance directive in a permanently unconscious state being sustained through
artificial nutrition and hydration, such as Nancy Cruzan, could not have the
artificial nutrition and hydration removed for over one year. 93 Even with proof
that satisfies the clear and convincing evidence standard, the guardians of an
individual such as Nancy Cruzan would have to wait over a year before the life
sustaining treatment could be removed. This rigorous standard may deny
permanently unconscious patients their Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
decision.
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court recognized that individuals have a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment. 94 The Court, however, upheld Missouri's clear and convincing
evidence standard on the ground that the state had a legitimate interest in
preserving human life that had to be balanced against the individual's interest.95
Most importantly, however, the Supreme Court recognized that the clear and
convincing evidence standard should be upheld because the state had a
legitimate interest in making certain that the surrogate decisionmakers were
actually performing the will of the incompetent patient. 96 In other words, the
heightened level of scrutiny served a legitimate state interest in assuring that the
surrogate decisionmakers were acting out the actual wishes of the patient and
not in their own self interest, whatever it may be.
However, the Ohio statute cannot be justified on any such grounds. The
year long wait will not serve to clarify or protect the patient's actual wishes.
After all the relevant evidence is weighed, the patient's guardians will either be
able to prove the incompetent person's desire to be removed from life support
systems, or they will not. If they fail to offer enough evidence, the state may
refuse to withdraw life support treatment. If, however, clear and convincing
93 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
95 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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evidence is offered that proves the patient would not wish to be on life support
systems, any further postponement of the patient's wishes does not become a
protection for the patient. It is merely an unnecessary delay in carrying out the
individual's desires.
Thus, although Missouri's heightened evidentiary standard may be justified
on the grounds that it helps assure the patient's true desires are being carried
out, Ohio's statute serves no such purpose. The State of Ohio is not attempting
to assure that the patient's actual wishes are being implemented. Indeed, the
Ohio statute is doing exactly the opposite. It forces an incompetent patient
without an advance directive to stay on life-sustaining treatment for one year
regardless of the amount of evidence the guardians may offer proving that the
patient's wishes are to the contrary. As a result, the year long provision cannot
be upheld on the same reasoning that the Missouri statute was upheld, because
Ohio's provision is not protecting the same state interest that was recognized in
the Cruzan case.
Thus, because Ohio's statute is not protecting the legitimate state interest
recognized in Cruzan, it must be protecting some other legitimate state interest
in order to be upheld. 97 If the provision is not protecting another legitimate
state interest, than the provision cannot be upheld because there will be no state
interest of greater magnitude than the individual's liberty interest.
Aside from the "particular" state interests found in the Cruzan case, four
state interests have been generally recognized for the purposes of analyzing
right to die cases: The integrity of the medical profession; the protection of
third parties; the prevention of suicide; and the preservation of life.98 The Ohio
statute must now be analyzed with respect to these interests.
A. The Integrity of the Medical Profession
A physician has a duty to provide a patient with any care necessary to the
maintenance of the patient's health. 99 Although any specific treatment given by
a physician must be knowingly and voluntarily consented to, such consent may
be implied in emergency situations when the patient is incapacitated. 100 Thus, it
may be argued that doctors are under an ethical duty to presume that all
97 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
98 See Ben A. Rich, The Assault on Privacy in Healthcare Decisionmal'ng, 68 DENV.
U.L. REv. 1, 11-16 (1991); Gasner, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that these state interests
have been "repeatedly recited").
99 James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, Trends in the Law: From Death to Life, 27 IDAHo
L. REv. 1, 5 (1990).
100 Id.
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incapacitated patients would wish to have their life prolonged by life support
systems. This duty would then require the doctors to maintain a permanently
unconscious patient on life support systems until the patient died, or the
treatment became burdensome or excessive.101
Such a view, however, rests on the mistaken presumption that doctors have
a duty to apply all aspects of medical technology in every situation.
Increasingly, physicians and nonphysicians alike have begun to realize that in
some instances medical care is intrusive and degrading. 10 2 Also, it should be
emphasized that the physician/patient relationship is primarily a contractual
one, with the physician obligated to provide only that treatment which the
patient desires. 103 Thus, when there is clear evidence indicating that the patient
would not wish such life sustaining treatment, it is obvious that the physician
should not be required to treat the patient.
Finally, it should be dispositive that the major medical organizations do
not object to the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration if the patient's
wishes are known.10 4 It would be anomalous to assert that the state, in the
101 Id. at 5. It should be noted that the physician is under no duty to provide
extraordinary care, that is, care in which the burdens on the patient greatly exceed the
benefits of treatment. Id. Some courts have explicitly held that life sustaining treatment is
burdensome, thus greatly reducing any valid arguments that such treatment is mandated by
medical ethics. See, e.g., In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 845, cert. denied, 488 U.S.
958 (1988); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (Mass. 1986).
102 See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and tie Law, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1519, 1644 (1991) (stating that, depending upon the situation, 75-99% of the
physicians asked thought that withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is proper); see also
Marcia Coyle, How Americans View the High Court, NAT'L L.J., February 26, 1990 at 36
col. 1 (88% of the population at large think that family should decide issues regarding life-
sustaining treatment if the patient is comatose with no hope of recovery).
103 Rich, supra note 98, at 4.
104 The American Medical Association states:
Even if death is not imminent but a patient is beyond doubt permanently unconscious,
and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis, it is not
unethical to discontinue all means of life-prolonging medical treatment. . . . If the
patient is incompetent to act on his own behalf and did not previously indicate his
preferences, the family or other surrogate decisionmaker, in concert with the physician,
must act in the best interest of the patient....
American Medical Association Council, AMA Ethical Opinion 2.18, Withholding or
Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment, in CURRENT OPn, -oNs OF THE CouNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS (1986). The American Academy of Neurology states:
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name of medical integrity, could force doctors to give treatments that they do
not wish to give, nor the patients receive. As a result, it is perfectly in line with
medical ethics to refrain from giving artificial nutrition and hydration when
clear and convincing evidence is available that the patient would not wish such
treatment. Thus, the Ohio statute should not be able to be upheld based on the
state's interest in protecting the ethics of the medical profession.
B. Protection of Third Parties
The interest of the state in protecting third parties is primarily concerned
with either the unborn child of the unconscious patient, or the patient's minor
children. 105 As for the interests of the unborn child, the Ohio statute has
specific provisions dealing with pregnant women who are either permanently
unconscious, terminally ill, or both. 106 Those provisions raise different issues
that are sufficiently complex that they merit much more attention than can be
given here. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that the
patient is not pregnant.
As for the interests of the minor child, there is some difficulty in the
contention that a parent's constitutional right should be less protected than the
rights of others.10 7 If a constitutional right exists in refusing artificial nutrition
and hydration, then that right should probably be applied equally to parents and
nonparents alike. 08 Further, it is difficult to imagine what interest a minor
child has in keeping a permanently unconscious parent alive. The incapacitated
parent can offer the child neither affection nor attention, and there is no
economic benefit to the child in keeping the parent on life support systems.
Thus, the state has no credible interest in protecting minor children that would
justify keeping an individual on life support systems contrary to his or her
wishes.
[Tihe decision to discontinue [the artificial provision of fluid and nutrition] should
be made in the same manner as other medical decisions, i.e., based on a careful
evaluation of the patient's diagnosis and prognosis, the prospective benefits and burdens
of the treatment, and the stated preferences of the patient and family.
American Academy of Neurology, Position of the American Academy of Neurology on
Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39
NEUROLOGY 123, 125 (1989).
105 Rich, supra note 98, at 14-15.
106 OmioREv. CODEANN. § 1337.13(B) (Baldwin 1991).
107 Rich, supra note 98, at 15.
108 Id.
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C. Prevention of Suicide
The Court in Cruzan explicitly recognized the state interests of preventing
suicide and preserving life.109 Although the majority opinion did not
characterize the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration as an act of suicide
the state could prevent, such an argument could still be made because the Court
reached its holding on other grounds without ever discussing the issue.
However, at least one member of the Court, Justice Scalia, would have
upheld the Missouri law based on the state's right to prevent suicide. 110 It is
Justice Scalia's belief that it is the job of the states, not the Court, to decide at
what point the failure to take action to preserve one's life is suicidal. 111 In
other words, because there is no traditional right to commit suicide, the
Constitution in no way inhibits the state from defining suicide as the refusal to
take artificial nutrition and hydration, and then forcing the individual to be
sustained on such treatment. 112 Thus, an argument can be made that the Ohio
statute is constitutional, based on the state's interest in preventing suicide.
Given the traditional interpretation and definition of suicide, though, most
commentators and judges have come to the conclusion that the termination of
life support systems is not a suicidal act. 113 This is because suicide is generally
thought of as an affirmative act on the part of the individual to end one's
life. 114
Justice Scalia points out, though, that the distinction does not lie between
action and inaction, but between what constitutes ordinary measures or heroic
measures to preserve one's life.' 15 For example, there is no distinction between
throwing oneself into the sea to be drowned, or sitting on the beach waiting for
the tide to take one's life.1 16 Thus, according to Justice Scalia, it is up to the
legislatures, not the courts, to determine what are the ordinary measures one
must take to preserve her life. 17
109 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
110 Id. at 295.
111 Id. at 300.
112 Id. at 294-96.
113 See Rich, supra note 98, at 9; Roberts, supra note 102, at 1668 (calling the state
interest in suicide "relatively insignificant").
114 Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1512 (1992).
115 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990).
116 Id.
117 Id.
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Justice Scalia's argument misses the point. As Justice Scalia himself states,
suicide is a "conscious" decision to end one's life.118 It is this very element of
consciousness which prevents the removal of life supports from PVS patients
from being a suicidal act. In other words, suicide is presumed to be a conscious
decision, made by a conscious individual, to end one's conscious life. People in
a permanently vegetative state, however, are not making a conscious decision
to end their conscious life. They are instead deciding that their conscious lives
are so precious to them, that they do not want their bodies artificially sustained
if they should ever become unconscious by natural causes beyond their control.
Thus, the termination of life support systems can be readily distinguished from
other acts that might constitute suicide.
Regardless of the above distinctions, when the Ohio living will statute is
read as a whole, it becomes obvious that the provision cannot be justified on
the state interest in preventing suicide. Although Ohio, like all the states, does
have an interest in preventing people from taking their own life through
suicide, this interest does not manifest itself in this case. The State of Ohio has
already made clear its decision that the removal of artificial nutrition and
hydration from a permanently unconscious patient is not a suicidal act.119 It has
done so in the living will statute that expressly allows for such removal of the
artificial nutrients with a proper advance directive.
Thus, because Ohio has already determined that it is not suicide to remove
artificial nutrition and hydration from patients with advance directives, the state
should not be able to invoke the state interest in preventing suicide for those
patients who have failed to make an advance directive. It cannot seriously be
maintained that one who chooses to forego artificial nutrition and hydration
through an advance directive has not attempted suicide, while one who makes
the same decision but fails to document it in an advance directive, has
attempted a suicide the state can prevent or delay.
118 Id.
119 The Ohio statute expressly provides that "[tihe death of a qualified patient or other
patient resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of fife-sustaining treatment in
accordance with this chapter does not constitute suicide, aggravated murder, murder, or any
other homicide offense for any purpose." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.12(A) (Baldwin
1991).
This section would seem, on its face, to apply to all patients, including patients that
have not executed an advance directive but instead have been permanently unconscious for
twelve months. The state would be hard pressed to argue that individuals who terminate life
support immediately through an advance directive have not committed suicide, while
individuals who do so ten months later without advance directives are deemed to have
committed suicide.
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In short, because the state has already characterized the decision to forego
artificial nutrition and hydration as a valid medical decision, it cannot claim
that the same decision, proven by clear and convincing evidence but not
documented in a living will, is a suicide attempt the state has an interest in
preventing. Thus, the state cannot maintain an interest paramount to that of the
individual based on the state's interest in preventing suicide.
D. Preservation of Life
The last state interest, and one expressly mentioned in the Cruzan decision,
is the state's interest in preserving life.120 This has been generally recognized
as the most powerful state interest, and was the primary state interest relied on
in the Supreme Court's opinion. In Cruzan, the Court stated that a state may
properly decline to make judgments about the "quality" of life that a particular
individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected
interests of the individual. 121 What is troubling about the Court's language is
that it seems to indicate that the state may sustain an individual on artificial
nutrition and hydration indefinitely, without considering how long the
individual has been unconscious, the prospects for recovery, or what is best for
the patient.
This language, however, should not be read as giving the states such broad
powers. Instead, the Court is probably simply preventing itself from going
down the "slippery slope" of deciding whether some lives are more important
than others. For example, the Court wanted to make clear that a paralyzed
person's life is not worth any less simply because that person might not have
the quality of life of a person not paralyzed. The language of the state court
holding regarding the interest in preserving life further illustrates this point.
The Supreme Court of Missouri stated:
It is tempting to equate the state's interest in the preservation of life with
some measure of quality of life.... But the state's interest is not in quality of
life.... Were quality of life at issue, persons with all manner of handicaps
might find the state seeking to terminate their lives. Instead, the state's interest
is in life; that interest is unqualified. 122
120 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
121 Id. at 282.
122 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 420 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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The court's (and Supreme Court's) announcement is absolutely correct in the
sense that no one would assert that the state must find a handicapped person's
life less valuable than a nonhandicapped person's. People with disabilities,
though, may not only be productive members of society, but most importantly
are also still experiencing life. However, the permanently unconscious do not
have, and never again will have, any awareness of their environment or
surroundings that make up what most of us consider "life."
In other words, the fear that society will begin valuing some people's lives
more than others, although a valid concern, does not manifest itself in the case
of the permanently unconscious. This is because a bright line test may be
drawn between the permanently unconscious, who have no cognizant
awareness, and those who do have consciousness at any level. Thus, although
the Court held that the state may assert an unqualified interest in life, it was
probably simply preventing itself from going down the "slippery slope" of
valuing human life based on age, intelligence, handicap, and other similar
criteria. This protection, however, should not be applicable to the permanently
unconscious, as they can be readily distinguished from conscious people who
may suffer from handicaps or any other debilitating condition.12 3
The Court's language might also indicate, however, that the state may
assert an unqualified interest in preserving a permanently unconscious patient,
regardless of the patient's quality of life, or lack thereof, while on life-
sustaining treatment. Regardless, even if the states could claim an interest in
sustaining patients just for the sake of prolonging an unconscious life, it is
difficult to fathom how this state interest could outweigh the individual's liberty
interest when balanced against it. A permanently unconscious individual offers
no benefit to society as a whole.124 They cannot be productive members of
123As Justice Brennan pointed out, the majority's holding could lead down an equally
dangerous "slippery slope." For example, it is not obvious from the Cruzan decision why
the state could not remove a kidney from Nancy and give it to an ailing third party, take
skin grafts or bone grafts from her, or use her body for experimentation. Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 313 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Such actions on the part of the state would surely be
prohibited by the Constitution. Id.
124 In fact, PVS patients represent a tremendous burden on society. The cost of care
for a PVS patient can range from $2,000 to $10,000 per month. Considered in light of the
number of PVS patients that must be taken care of annually, the health cost for these
patients may range from $120 million to $1.2 billion per year. Cranford, supra note 1, at
31-32. This is not in any way to insinuate that lives which "cost" more to sustain should be
determined less valuable than other lives. Instead, the cost of these patients merely lessens
the credibility of a state interest in the life of a PVS patient that outweighs the patient's own
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.
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society, nor enjoy any of the pleasures or comforts that society has to offer
them. 125 Thus, the state interest in preserving a PVS life should not outweigh
an individual liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.
What is more compelling, perhaps, is the state interest in preserving a PVS
life in the hopes that the patient will recover. This interest is, in fact, exactly
what the Ohio legislature appears to have been protecting when it enacted the
year-wait provision. 126 The legislators obviously felt that individuals without
advance directives should be given one year of life-sustaining treatment in the
hope that they come out of their chronic vegetative state. Thus, the state may
contend that the provision protects a legitimate state interest in preserving life
in the hope of recovery.
Despite the fact that, on occasion, miraculous recoveries have
happened, 127 the state's interest in preserving life should not be paramount to
the individual's liberty interest. The truth of the matter is that the chances of
recovery after having fallen into a persistent vegetative state are less than
125 The fact that PVS patients cannot experience or appreciate anything that society
has to offer is probably a more compelling reason to assert that the state's interest in
preserving life does not outweigh the individual's liberty interest. Indeed, it would be
unsettling to assert that the state has a greater interest in preserving the more "productive"
lives, as this would lead down the "slippery slope" discussed earlier in which handicapped
persons' lives would be worth less than people without handicaps. But in the situation of a
PVS patient, in which not only is the patient completely incapacitated, but also completely
unable to enjoy or experience "society" or his environment on any level, it is less troubling
to assert that the state interest is diminished when compared to the individual's liberty
interest.
126 The year wait can really not be justified on any other ground. Further, state
Senator Betty Montgomery, the main sponsor of the bill, indicated that this was the primary
reason for the provision at a discussion on the bill.
127 Perhaps the most well known example of this phenomenon is one Carrie Coons. In
October of 1988, the eighty-six year old woman suffered a massive stroke that eventually
caused her to lapse into unconsciousness. She was able to breathe on her own, but was
placed on artificial nutrition and hydration to sustain her. A few days after the trial court
ruled that there was sufficient evidence to remove Ms. Coons from the systems, she awoke.
She was able to ingest small amounts of food on her own, and was able to speak
somewhat, although communication with her was difficult and sporadic. As expected, the
trial court quickly revoked its order. The reasons for Ms. Coons' recovery are unknown,
although it was documented that the nursing staff aggressively stimulated her and tried to
feed her by mouth. Ms. Coons' condition remains unchanged. See Stephan Haimowitz &
Robin Goldman, A Patient Returns from "Death with Dignity"." Error, Uncertainty and the
Right to Die, N.Y. ST. BJ., Ocr. 1990, at 58, 59.
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infinitesimal. 128 Thus, given the pain and hardship imposed on those close to
the patient along with lack of a feasible chance of recovering, the balance
should tip in favor of individual choice. Families and friends should not have to
sit idly by while the chronically vegetative patient is force fed artificial
nutrients. The decision to terminate the life support systems should be made by
the family, as long as they can provide clear and convincing evidence that they
are carrying out the patient's desires. 129 Thus, even a state interest in
preserving a PVS patient in the hopes of recovery should not be deemed
greater than the individual's liberty interest.
VI. THE CRITICAL LOOK
Because the right to die issue first appeared in the judicial sphere, the
courts have struggled considerably with the problem of finding suitable
doctrines with which to deal with nondeclarants. The two tests that have been
most utilized by the courts are: (1) the substituted judgment doctrine; and (2)
the best interests test. The substituted judgment doctrine requires the judge to
place herself in the position of the incompetent patient and determine whether
the patient would wish to continue the life sustaining procedures. 130 The best
interest test, on the other hand, does not look into the desires of the patient, but
instead forces the judge to determine whether it is in the patient's best interest
to maintain treatment.1 31
Despite the frequency with which these tests are used, both have recently
been criticized as being intellectually dishonest and judicially unsound. Critics
of the substituted judgment doctrine point out that it is impossible to know
what the nondeclarant would have preferred, and any decision reached is
128 Over 10,000 patients, including Nancy Cruzan, have fallen into a persistent
vegetative state in the last twenty years from loss of oxygen to the brain. Of those 10,000
patients, medical literature has documented only three partial recoveries. See Brief of the
American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (No. 88-1503).
129 See generally Cindy Rushton & Elizabeth Hogue, The Role of Families as
Surrogate Decisionmakers after Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 7 J.
CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 219 (1991) (positing that the decision to remove life support
systems should belong exclusively to the family, subject to appeal to the courts only by the
attending physicians if they believe the family is not acting in the best interests of the
patient).
130 See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299-300 (111. 1989);
Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1236, 1267-69 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1512
(1992); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633-35 (Mass. 1986).
131 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-33 (N.J. 1985).
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tainted with the biases of the judge, the family, and the doctors. 132 The best
interest test, on the other hand, is not really a best interest test at all, because
permanently unconscious patients can neither feel, think, nor experience, and
thus do not have a "best interest."' 33
As a result of the growing dissatisfaction with the judicial standards, the
courts and commentators have looked to the legislature for a solution to this
dilemma. The Ohio Legislature answered the call, but failed to come up with a
solution that adequately dealt with the problem of nondeclarants. 134
A. The Ohio Statute Runs Contrary to Public Opinions
Unfortunately, the Ohio statute fails to accurately reflect the views of most
individuals. Studies show that an overwhelming majority of people believe that
decisions on whether to terminate life support systems, including artificial
nutrition and hydration, belong with the family. 135 Indeed, this is not only the
view of most citizens at large, but is also the view receiving widespread
support from commentators as well. 13 6 Not only are family members most
likely to know what the patient would have desired, but they are most likely to
have the patient's best interests at heart. Also, the family members have the
132 See Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1272-74 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
133 Gold, supra note 20, at 1090-91.
134 The Ohio statute in essence adopts a substituted judgment standard. Although this
standard has been criticized for the reasons mentioned above, it is at least more appropriate
for the legislature, rather than judges, to make the determination of what standard should be
used.
135 See Gasner, supra note 4, at 13-14. Gasner cites a 1986 poll by the American
Medical Association in which 73% of the people responding thought that life support
systems, including artificial nutrition and hydration, should be removed if the family
requests the discontinuation of such treatment. Gasner also points to a poll conducted by
Ted Koppel that shows that 70% feel that the family should decide whether life supports
should be removed from permanently unconscious patients.
136 See generally Gasner, supra note 4; Stephen A. Newman, Treatment Refiisals for
the Citically and Terninally 11: Proposed Rules for the Famdly, the Physidan, and the
State, 3 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 35, 46 (1985); Rushton, supra note 129.
Also, the American Medical Association states that "if the patient is incompetent to act
in his own behalf and did not previously indicate his preferences, the family or other
surrogate decisionmaker, in concert with the physician, must act in the best interest."
American Medical Association Council, supra note 104. This view is supported by the
American Academy of Neurology as well. American Academy of Neurology, supra note
104.
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most to suffer, emotionally and many times financially, from a permanently
unconscious patient. Thus, it is eminently logical that the decision be given to
the family immediately, and not taken out of their hands for over a year.
Further, a recent study shows that 85% of those surveyed indicated that
they would not wish to be maintained through artificial nutrition and hydration
if they fell permanently unconscious and could not eat on their own. 137 This
statistic is especially unsettling when read in conjunction with the small number
of people who will eventually implement advance directives. Given the small
amount of people who will actually implement an advance directive, and the
large number of people who do not wish to be artificially maintained, it seems
apparent that the Ohio law will trample on the desires of the people it is
supposed to protect.
B. The Ohio Statute Is Not Supported by Modem Medical Opinion
Contrary to prevailing medical authority, the living will statute
distinguishes between artificial nutrition and hydration and other means of life
support. The statute demands that removal of artificial nutrition and hydration
from a permanently unconscious person be approved by the probate court,
which must withhold such permission if it finds that clear and convincing
evidence does not exist showing that the patient would have wanted such
removal. 138 This requirement, at the very least, delays the family's wishes by
another one to two months after they have already waited one year to seek such
removal. At the worst, it prevents families from carrying out their wishes
altogether by empowering a judge to find that the clear and convincing
evidence standard has not been met.
It could be claimed that death by the removal of nutrients is somehow
more gruesome than death by the removal of other life support systems, and
thus worthy of the extra protection. Although some commentators have
described in unpleasant detail the process of dying by dehydration, such
descriptions become meaningless when one realizes that permanently
unconscious patients cannot suffer.139 Indeed, the Ohio statute does not permit
137 See Gasner, supra note 4, at 14 (citing to a survey performed by the Colorado
Graduate School of Public Affairs).
138 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
139 Death by the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration would take anywhere
between one and thirty days. Although death by starvation or dehydration normally causes
some extremely horrible side effects (dry mouth caked with thick material, swollen and
cracked tongue, nose bleeds), most can be alleviated through good nursing care during the
withdrawal period. Cranford, supra note 1, at 31. Further, none of the symptoms will be
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the removal of artificial nutrients if a finding is made that the nutrients provide
any comfort care to the patient.140 Thus, once it is established that comfort care
is not being provided by the nutrition and hydration, there remains absolutely
no reason to distinguish between artificial nutrients and other measures of life
support.
Also, the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration has been generally
recognized by all the major medical organizations as no different than other
forms of medical treatment.1 41 This view is further reflected in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan, in which she expressly rejects the
distinction between artificial nutrition and hydration and other life support
systems. 142 In fact, the majority opinion in Cruzan also implies that no
distinction between the two methods of life support are justified, and thus it is
possible that any constitutional arguments attempting to distinguish the two will
not be successful.' 43 Thus, the Ohio statute reflects an illogical and outdated
opinion with regards to the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration. 144
experienced by the patient because, as stated before, the loss of the cerebral cortex
precludes the PVS patient from experiencing any such sensations. Id.
140 OinoREv. CODEANN. § 2133.09(A)(3) (Baldwin 1991).
141 According to the American Academy of Neurology, "[t]he artificial provision of
nutrition and hydration is a form of medical treatment analogous to other forms of life
sustaining treatment... such as the use of the respirator." This is also the position taken by
the American Medical Association. See Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 308 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing to American Academy of Neurology,
supra note 104; American Medical Association Council, AMA Ethical Opinion 2.20,
Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment in CURRENT OPINIONS OF
THE COUNCIL ON ETHCAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS (1989)).
142 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing American Medical
Association Council, AMA Ethical Opinion 2.20, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-
Prolonging Medical Treatment, in CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHIcAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Current Opinions 13 (1989); THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON
THE TERMINATION OF LIFE SUSTAINING TREATmENT AND CARE OF THE DYING 59 (1987)).
143 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273-75. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the Conroy case for the
proposition that artificial nutrition and hydration is no different than other forms of life-
sustaining treatment, causing some commentators to believe the Court has adopted this
approach. See Wayne Karbal, The Constitutional Dimensions of the Right to Refuse
Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration: An Analysis of Cruzan, 23 1. HEALTH & HOSP.
L. 241, 244 (1990).
144 Indeed, the Ohio statute is truly a step backwards for protecting the right to refuse
medical treatment when considered in light of the recent cases allowing termination of life
support systems for the permanently unconscious. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp.
580 (D.R.I. 1988) (removal of feeding tube permitted); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d
674 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (removal of feeding tube allowed); McConnell v. Beverly
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The fact that PVS patients must wait one year before life support may be
withdrawn also represents a misunderstanding of modem medical studies
regarding patients in persistent vegetative states. Such patients, as noted before,
have virtually no chance of recovery. Further, doctors, not lawyers, are in the
best position to determine how long a patient must be in a PVS before the
person's condition is hopeless.
In fact, recent medical studies show that there is no one set length of time
that doctors should walt before finding that artificial life supports should be
removed. 145 Instead, such determinations depend upon a variety of factors,
including the age of the patient and the nature of the injury suffered. For
example, a patient whose brain has suffered a severe deprivation of oxygen
from asphyxial injuries or a cardiac arrest should probably be given only one
month to come out of the PVS.146 On the other hand, a doctor might
recommend that a young patient who has suffered a head injury from a car
accident should be given six months to a year to come out of the vegetative
state. 147 Because older people have less chance of recovery than younger
individuals, the current medical view also supports a shorter or longer wait
depending upon the age of the victim. 148 Thus, the twelve month wait is a
largely arbitrary length of time, and is unsupported by contemporary medical
literature.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ohio's living will statute goes a long way in solving some of the difficult
problems raised by today's medical technology. It provides individuals with a
convenient way to express their desires concerning life-sustaining treatment
should they become terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state.
Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989) (removal of gastronomy tube
allowed pursuant to a statute when patient had previously expressed wishes concerning life-
sustaining treatment); Corbett v. D'Allessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(removal of feeding tube permitted from PVS patient); In re Estate of Longeway, 549
N.E.2d 292 (IlL. 1989) (authorizing removal of gastronomy tube); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d
947 (Me. 1987) (life-sustaining procedures removed from patient in PVS); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986) (feeding tube removed from PVS
patient); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (allowing permanently unconscious
patient to be removed from life support systems); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (NJ. 1987)
(treatment discontinued in elderly PVS patient); In re lobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987)
(removal of life supports from PVS patient permitted).
145 Council Report, supra note 18, at 427-28.
146 Id. at 427.
147 Id. at 428.
14S Id. at 427-28.
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However, the statute fails in its attempt to adequately provide for
nondeclarants. It is underprotective of an individual's constitutional rights for
those people that find themselves in a permanently unconscious state without an
advance directive. The statute refuses to recognize that people without advance
directives also have a constitutional right to decline medical treatment once
their desire to do so has been proven, as mandated by the Cruzan decision.
This right cannot arbitrarily be taken away without an overriding state interest,
and because none exists, the state's mandate that such individuals walt a year
before the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration violates their rights
under the Constitution.
The practical implications, as opposed to merely the constitutional
implications, are unsettling as well. The statute shuts its eyes to the reality that
human beings, by nature, do not like to think about their own death, and will
not plan ahead for the possible tragedy of entering a permanently vegetative
state. It also ignores modem medical opinions regarding PVS patients, and the
beliefs of the constituents the statute was designed to protect. Thus, the Ohio
legislature should rethink its most recent attempt to deal with the right to die
issue, and come up with a solution that will put such difficult decisions back in
the hands of the families, where they rightfully belong.
Gregory Brunton
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